Information Security Risks Assessment: A Case Study by Ayo, Samuel Cris et al.
1 
 
Information Security Risks Assessment: A Case Study 
SAMUEL CRIS AYO, BONAVENTURE NGALA, OLASUNKANMI AMZAT, 
ROBIN LAL KHOSHI, SAMARAPPULIGE ISURU MADUSANKA 
{u1815973, u1637893, u1709040, u1740368, u1634440}@uel.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
Owing to recorded incidents of Information technology inclined organisations failing to respond effectively to threat 
incidents, this project outlines the benefits of conducting a comprehensive risk assessment which would aid 
proficiency in responding to potential threats. The ultimate goal is primarily to identify, quantify and control the key 
threats that are detrimental to achieving business objectives. 
This project carries out a detailed risk assessment for a case study organisation. It includes a comprehensive 
literature review analysing several professional views on pressing issues in Information security. In the risk register, 
five prominent assets were identified in respect to their owners. The work is followed by a qualitative analysis 
methodology to determine the magnitude of the potential threats and vulnerabilities. Collating these parameters 
enabled the valuation of individual risk per asset, per threat and vulnerability. 
Evaluating a risk appetite aided in prioritising and determining acceptable risks. From the analysis, it was deduced 
that human being posed the greatest Information security risk through intentional/ unintentional human error. In 
conclusion, effective control techniques based on defence in-depth were devised to mitigate the impact of the 
identified risks from risk register. 
Keywords: Risks Assessment, Information Security, Security Controls, Risk Register, Risks Appetite. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
To make sure information or data stored in computers are not at risks of being compromised or tampered with, 
organisations need to deploy Information security management techniques. A risk is an effect of uncertainty on 
objectives and risk management as the coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk 
[1]. Risk management process is the systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the 
activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context and identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, 
monitoring and reviewing risk. Risk assessment is the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation [1] [2]. Risk management maximises organisation output while minimising chances of unexpected 
outcomes [3]. 
 
This brings us to security management and why organisations should ensure information security management 
systems are in place. Information security management systems preserve the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability [4] of information by applying a risk management process and gives confidence to interested parties that 
risks are adequately managed. For this report, SparTax Collection Agency (SCA), a medium-sized sub-Sahara 
African enterprise is the organisation this report will focus on because African economies are the most vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks [5]. 
 
Africa is facing several Internet-related challenges concerning security risk, intellectual property infringement and 
protection of personal data [6] which has, for instance, cost South African economy $573 million, the Nigerian 
economy $200 million, and the Kenyan economy $36 million [6]. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
account for over 95% of firms and 60%-70% of employment and generate a large share of new jobs in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies [7]. Similar trends are being observed globally, 
and risks brought about by disruptive internet technologies such as the information security breaches. Because SCA 
is also an SME just like the majority of other firms globally, the same techniques applied in this report can be 
applied across several organisations globally.  
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SparTax Collection Agency (SCA) is an organisation contracted by the Finance Authority of one of the Sub-Sahara 
African local governments to collect revenue in the form of taxes. The organisation has to be viewed as that which 
uses taxpayers’ information with integrity to meet local government revenue obligations for it to be viewed as that 
which focuses on the developmental interests of the local government. SCA deploys a Revenue Management 
System (RMS) for all taxpayers account information and revenue management. The RMS is a one-stop platform 
where all data is integrated and analysed. It is also integrated online to other third-party systems and tools of partner 
agencies and institutions such as ports clearance systems, standards clearance system among others for coordinated 
day-to-day operations. In addition, SCA has contracted three other companies (Lamogi+, A&A and PAK) to provide 
other services of identifying new taxable businesses, maintaining and monitoring transit cargo real-time. The agency 
has also contracted a third-party company MyCloud to provide additional cloud services as a backup to their data 
centre.   
 
The agency employs 1550 staff, 100 of which belong to the Information Technology (IT) and Information Security 
(IS) department. Among them are 10% of the staff is responsible for Information Security Management (ISM) in the 
agency while the rest with various levels of undocumented security clearances are charged with other IT support 
services within the company. More than half of SCA’s staffs are on outsourced contract basis or internship and are 
on a minimum wage payment plan, which has continuously been an issue of complaint among many staffs who feel 
it is unfair. Fig.1 below shows the company’s management organisational structure. All the activities coordination at 
SCA are dependent on the support staff at their respective workstations exchanging communications by email, 
phone calls or SMS alerts over the public network infrastructure for incidents management and control.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. SparTax Collection Agency (SCA) Organisational Structure 
 
The company has had one general-purpose information security management policy for the last five years, but only 
department managers and selected staff members have been adequately trained on the policy. Implementation of the 
policy across the company has never been of paramount significance. However, since June 2016, the agency has had 
three major security breaches among other minor attempts leading to some undisclosed financial losses to the 
company. It is on this background that SCA has been tasked to develop a clear and thorough ISM strategy and report 
to be presented to the stakeholders. 
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In Section 2 below, we shall review five publications relating to cybersecurity, data breach impacts, economic 
valuation for Information Security investment, assessing Information Security value in organisations and 
Information Security Investment Decisions making. Then under Section 3, we shall describe the scope of our 
assessment, identify critical assets for the organisation, their threats and vulnerabilities and proceed to analyse the 
results tabulated in the risk register regarding risk appetite, choice and impact of controls. The conclusion of final 
work is presented in the last section. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Schatz et al analysed several existing definitions given to cybersecurity [8]. The approach was used to 
derive an appropriate definition which was deemed fit based on several factors. These involved identifying the 
predominant and acceptable definitions, expressing viewpoints from the contentious differences and finally 
concluding on the best match through specific techniques. From the literature review conducted, viewpoints from 
several distinct references where weighed against each other and it could be observed that the difference lied 
between the scope of the concept, motive, opportunity and form of attack. A series of tools and techniques were 
utilised to compare and extract notable similarities amongst top definitions from selected sources. Techniques used 
involved inclusion and exclusion criteria which involved refining the search for definitions based on a series of best-
fit conditions. A text mining framework tool was also used to examine keyword similarities before which dataset 
were normalised to standardise the character encoding. A stemming process was also carried out to reduce the 
number of distinct word types and increase the frequency of occurrence of significant word types. This rigorous 
process resulted in attributing values to the selected definitions to create an avenue for comparison. The aim was to 
fish out the most relevant attributes from the definition pool. Finally, a co-occurrence network analysis method was 
used to craft a new definition using a Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) network graph model in addition to filtering 
the term frequency to disintegrate the information to the salient points further.  The derived definition was proven to 
be representative regarding semantic similarity and not just from a human-derived perspective. It was validated 
through the same semantic analysis benchmarking by weighing it up against the existing definition, and it ranked 
tops in this analysis. 
 
Just as with any improvement, infallibility cannot be guaranteed, a significant limitation and area of improvement of 
this paper has been identified. In my opinion, utilising techniques to determine key similarities from a set of 
definitions which has arguably been subjectively deemed viable is not the ultimate approach to derive the most 
qualitative and relevant definition. There is a possibility that the selected definitions are not optimum in existence 
regarding relevance to what cybersecurity genuinely mean. Although the probability could be very slim, this 
research could potentially be a situation of picking out a decent definition from a bad bunch. It is believed that 
further analysis of more explicit definitions (including definitions defined in foreign languages) could yield a better-
improved definition. Also, as pointed out by Schatz, Bashroush and Wall [8], the new derived definition stemmed 
from an iteration of sentences constructed manually, better still automatic means could be capable of iterating more 
combinations leading to a more relevant definition. Nevertheless, the proposed definition has proved to be unbiased 
and explicit given that it takes vital points from various viable sources.  
 
2.2  According to Schatz and Bashroush [9], the impact of repeated data breach events on organisations’ market 
value, examines the influence of information security breaches on organisations stock market value. The study 
adopted the event study methodology, whereby data breaches for businesses category data was obtained from 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC), analysed and the findings projected to the broader economic impact of such 
events. However, the quality and quantity of data obtained from PRC was not sufficient and mainly focused on the 
United States of America (USA) based entities as acknowledged by Schatz and Bashroush [9]. The result, therefore, 
gave a weak conclusion that organisations stock prize suffers from a publicly announced information security 
breach.  
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Irrespective of the sample size, data breaches affect performance and reputation of organisations. Therefore, 
organisations and investors should take more initiatives of having secure and continually managed and maintained 
information systems. Also, [9] focuses on business breach category and does not factor in government breach 
category which although most of them are not publicly traded in the stock market, their reputation, a key asset and to 
that matter “value” is affected by breaches. 
 
2.3    Economic Valuation for Information Security Investment: A Systematic Literate Review [10] addresses the 
issue of economic evaluation for information security investment. Daniel Schatz and Rabih Bashroush have 
conducted a systematic literature review on methods used by organisations to evaluate considered critical elements 
of decisions regarding information security investments. They pinpoint out that even if there are researches 
conducted to evaluate suitable approaches measuring expenditure of information security, there is a knowledge gap 
in practitioners to identify key criteria regarding information security investment. The contributions are a 
comparison framework, a catalogue of existing approaches; trends that help navigate existing work. Daniel Schatz 
and Rabih Bashroush point out that there is no tangible return on investment and further explains how information 
security measures aim to reduce loss.  Therefore, it involves identification of current and future threats on assets, 
identification of highest valued assets and implementation of controls to reduce or mitigate risks. It further points 
out challenges faces by security professionals transferring risks into financial formulas. The Authors present several 
arguments presented by various research papers on multiple approaches taken by organisations.  
 
The authors have conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) to provide structured and systematic methods to 
search, examine and evaluate current research questions. It follows the guidance provided by Kitchnham and 
Charters [11], Brereton et al. [12], Biochini et al. [13] and Cronin et al. [14]. The authors started the SLR process 
with the construction and definition of five research questions. The authors have constructed a search mechanism to 
capture relevant material which accommodates defined research questions. The authors have conducted systematic 
searches in several databases for research papers.  The search scope narrowed on relevance to computer science and 
information security field. The results were filtered based on inclusion and exclusion criteria and database 
refinements, and it reduced down the results to 270 from 779. 
 
Further reductions have resulted in 25 papers and used for data extractions. Authors have extracted nine important 
approach categories. After analysing the results, three main categories were chosen. They are Return on Investment 
(ROI), Real Options Theory (ROT), and Utility Maximization (UM). 
 
2.4  This study [15] describes a tested model that key constructs to consider when assessing the value of 
organisation information security assets. The research focuses on practitioners and researchers in IT security field 
and try to contribute significant knowledge on information security value chains in an organisation. The authors 
have proposed an evidence-based model. It combines theoretical work with real-world scenarios for assessing 
information security values in an organisation. The proposed model comprises five lament variables namely drivers, 
threats, accounting aspects, business environment and security capabilities [16]. They represent the critical areas of 
the context, how these lament variables relate to each other was investigated and were analysed. Then it was 
examined which relationship is significant using the Partial Least Square – Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-
SEM) [17]. PLS-SEM model enhances support for the proposed model by authors. To verify the proposed model, 
authors have collected a high volume of data and analysed using a survey instrument specially designed using the 
structured equation modelling (SEM). The authors have emphasised that ignorance of relevant threats could have a 
negative impact on the organisation and it has a positive correlation with the security maturity of the environment. 
Security capabilities are therefore significant in accomplishing overall business values. 
 
2.5  The study by Daniel and Rabih [18] follows a grounded theory approach focused on information security 
investments and handling by experienced practitioners which are condensed into 15 principles. It highlights current 
practices, the key drivers and challenges in security investment strategies as well as organisational business 
environment factors relevant. Notable in the study is that decisions for Information security investments processes 
are initiated by “driving factors” and adjusted by “Challenges and Constraints”. From this study, it’s found that 
when information security investments support businesses to safely innovate, increase market agility, and enhance 
customer trust, they become competitive as compared to conventional budgeting approaches where funds are 
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directed towards a ‘minimum protection/maximum compliance’ strategy rather than initiatives that contribute the 
most value to the organisation. The study illustrates the need to have a decision support process along with 
evidence-based approaches to avoid having problems. It encourages the adoption of standards such as ISO/IEC 
27001 to identify control areas, not in line with control frameworks and ensures investments add value to an 
organisation.  When it came to security control effectiveness metrics, it was scarce and so the need to address the 
shortfall. Controls that could add overall value to an organisation at comparable costs had multiple benefits. In the 
study, practitioners are encouraged to adopt economic value approaches for financial valuations or performance 
models to justify security investments. Failure to adopt these values should relegate them to compliance and audit 
function. Eventually, risk reduction metrics are to be used to measure Information security program values. 
 
The study [18] brought out the keys investment decision principles but faces a challenge in the diversity scope 
which makes the finding partial. The study is however limited to the United Kingdom and a small portion in the 
USA, all of which are developed economies compared to the rest of the developing economies. Since information 
security is becoming a global issue, the study should be expanded to include the rest of the developing countries as 
well, and the criteria for selecting practitioners should be elaborated more clearly. 
3.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1       Purpose 
Undertaking the risk assessment is to strategically identify the prominent threats and vulnerabilities that pose to 
hinder the organisation from achieving its business objective. The result from the risk register would be utilised in 
devising appropriate mitigation plans to reduce identified risk level to the barest minimum. 
 
Fig . 2. Risk Assessment Flowchart (Adopted and modified from [19]) 
Results Documentation   Risk assessment report 
System Characterization 
Threat Identification 
Vulnerability 
Identification 
Likelihood Determination 
Risk Valuation 
Control Recommendation 
 Delineation of system 
boundary  
 Interrogation of asset owners 
 Track record of previous attacks 
 List of threats for SCA  
 Interrogation of asset owners 
 Penetration test on assets  
 List of vulnerabilities for SCA  
 Track record of previous attacks 
 Interrogation of asset owners 
 Threat severity  
 Likelihood valuation 
  Quantification of combined 
effect of asset, threat and 
vulnerability i.e. A*T*V 
 Risk Register  
 Identified acceptance level 
risk  
 Recommended controls 
 Hardware, Software and other IT 
systems within the scope of SCA 
Risk Assessment Actions  
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3.2 Risk assessment methodology flowchart  
The Fig.2 above gives a diagrammatic representation of the risk assessment methodology flowchart. It 
includes an orderly step-by-step process of the stages involved in carrying out the risk assessment for the 
organisation. 
3.3    Scope and assets identified  
 
After project sizing, we examine ISM of the significant assets to SCA according to management requirements. As 
stated under the Introduction Section, SCA is a model organisation depicting the general trends in the ISM in sub-
Sahara Africa. We have followed a structural process to identify the organisation assets and their values using 
TABLE.1, then identify and collect similar threats and vulnerabilities from the respective asset owners. 
Eventually, we quantify the likelihood and impact of these threats with a commonly adopted industry model as 
elaborated later below. 
 
 
Asset 
Values 
 
Type of 
effect 
level 
of effect 
 
Company 
embarrassment 
level 
 
Personal 
safety 
implication 
 
Personal 
privacy 
infringement 
 
Failure to 
meet legal 
obligations 
 
Financial 
loss (£) 
 
Disruption to 
activities (£) 
(time & effort 
to recover 
from incident) 
1 Insignificant Contained 
within Work 
Area at worst 
Minor 
injury to 
individual 
Isolated 
personal 
detail 
revealed 
Civil suit 
resulting in 
less than £10k 
damages 
Up to 10k Up to 10k 
2 Minor Contained 
within 
Company at 
worst 
Minor 
injury to 
several 
people 
Isolated 
personal 
detail 
compromised 
Civil suit 
(above £10k). 
Small fine (up 
to £1k) 
10k to 
100k 
10k to 100k 
3 Significant Local public or 
Press become 
aware 
Major 
injury to 
individual 
Several 
personal 
details 
revealed 
Large fine 
(above £10k) 
100k to 
500k 
100k to 500k 
4 Major National public 
or Press become 
aware 
Major 
injury to 
several 
people or 
death of 
individual 
Several 
personal 
details 
compromised 
Custodial 
sentence 
imposed 
500k to 
1000k 
500k to 1000k 
5 Acute Senior Staff 
forced to resign 
or Company 
fails 
Death of 
several 
people 
All personal 
details 
revealed 
and/or 
compromised 
Multiple civil 
or criminal 
suits 
Above 
1000k 
Above 1000k 
 
TABLE.1 Asset Values using Impacts of Incidents Matrix 
 
On review, justifications and approval from management of the completed project sizing, we summarized the top 
five valuable assets as Pure Information in the form of Electronic data (data at rest, data in use and data in motion) 
without which SCA’s business operations would be close to impossible, Physical IT hardware (mainly as Servers 
and End User Electronics) which provide the technical supporting platforms on which all the organisation operates. 
The other vital assets included the software Revenue Management System (RMS) used to process and manage 
business information processes, Organisation Reputation (intangible asset) which determines whether its business 
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contracts be maintained or terminated in subsequent years and the Human Resource (staff) that are pillar in the 
operational success of the organization and are also the weakest link in the security chain. 
3.4 Risk register 
 
Using Qualitative Risk Analysis approach, this Section presents the detailed Risk Register framework for the 
organisation, highlighting assets threats, vulnerabilities and risks impact. A Threat is a potential cause of an incident 
that may result in harm to a system or organisation; Vulnerability is a weakness of an asset or group of assets that 
may be exploited by one or more threats and Impact is the result of Information Security incident, caused by a threat 
which affects assets [20] [1] [4]. A risk assessment approach is used to identify vulnerabilities, threats and impacts 
to which security controls will be applied. 
 
Because of the logical simplicity and wide adaptability across several organisations, we have adopted the Asset 
Values and Impacts Matrix (TABLE. 1) to get a qualitative value of assets affected by risk incidents; Threat and 
Vulnerability Likelihood Table (TABLE .2) to quantify threat occurrences possibilities and quantify the degree of 
vulnerability. It should be noted that the weighing and values/figures in these tables are not fixed based on any 
known standard but rather on the logical significance of the interpretation as deemed fit by the organisation. In this 
report, the asset owners are responsible for accurately collecting the threats and vulnerabilities of every asset and the 
respective occurrences likelihood potentials whereas asset owners and suppliers are responsible for the value of the 
assets to be used in the Risks Register generated in TABLE .3 below.  
 
 
 
LIKELIHOOD 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
INTERPRETATION 
 
1 Negligible Once every 1000 years or less 
2 Extremely Unlikely Once every 200 years 
3 Very Unlikely Once every 50 years 
4 Unlikely Once every 20 years 
5 Feasible Once every 5 years 
6 Probable Annually 
7 Very Probable Quarterly 
8 Expected Monthly 
9 Confidently Expected Weekly 
10 Certain Daily 
 
TABLE.2 Threats and Vulnerability Likelihood Table 
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TABLE.3 Risk Assessment Register (the different assets in colour code)
RISK LINE ID No. Assets Owner Values (A) Threats
Likelihood 
(T)
Vulnerabilities
Likelihood 
(V)
Risks
(A*T*V)
16 Electronic Data CIO 5 Human error 8 Mental Stress 9 360
18 Electronic Data CIO 5 Human error 8 Employees Physical fatigue 9 360
17 Electronic Data CIO 5 Human error 8 Fear to Consult 8 320
14 Electronic Data CIO 5 SQL Injections 6 Execution of malfunctioned queries irrespective of warnings 9 270
15 Electronic Data CIO 5 SQL Injections 6 Outdated DBMS 9 270
2 Reputation CEO 5 Data breach 6 Existence of backdoor 8 240
7 Ruputation CEO 5 Fraud 6 Disgruntled employees 8 240
13 Electronic Data CIO 5 SQL Injections 6 Bad coding Designs 8 240
1 Reputation CEO 5 Data breach 6 Outdated Security Software 7 210
3 Reputation CEO 5 Data breach 6 Reliance of reputation on trust 7 210
25 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Cross-Site Scripting 7 Susceptibility to Malicious code 10 210
27 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Cross-Site Scripting 7 User input support through input field 10 210
4 Reputation CEO 5 Misuse of resources 6 Staff dishonesty 6 180
5 Reputation CEO 5 Misuse of resources 6 Unclear resources utilization guidelines 6 180
6 Reputation CEO 5 Misuse of resources 6 Poor resource management 6 180
8 Ruputation CEO 5 Fraud 6 Unclear System Access Clearance guidelines 6 180
9 Ruputation CEO 5 Fraud 6 Staff dishonesty (Integrity loss or failure) 6 180
11 Electronic Data CIO 5 Data theft 6 Disgruntled employees 6 180
12 Electronic Data CIO 5 Data theft 6 Disposal of Storage media without proper erasure 6 180
26 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Cross-Site Scripting 7 Support for various unsafe scripting technologies. 8 168
34 IT Hardware CIO 2 Power interruptions 9 Inability to operate without power supply 9 162
36 IT Hardware CIO 2 Power interruptions 9 Fluctuating power supply (Unstable Power Supply) 9 162
37 Staff COO 2 Social engineering 9 Human tendency to be gullible (getting something for nothing) 9 162
38 Staff COO 2 Social engineering 9 Inclination for immediate gratification 9 162
150
39 Staff COO 2 Social engineering 9 Inclination to Improved status gain 9 162
23 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Stack-Overflow attacks 6 Weaknesses in the programming language used to develop the systems 8 144
24 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Stack-Overflow attacks 6 Zero-day vulnerabilities 8 144
35 IT Hardware CIO 2 Power interruptions 9 Inability of backup power (UPS) to sustain long hours  8 144
19 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Denial Of Services 6 Low Memory Resources 6 108
20 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Denial Of Services 6 Limited Bandwidth 6 108
21 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Denial Of Services 6 Protocols in use such as Telnet 6 108
22 Revenue Management System CIO 3 Stack-Overflow attacks 6 Bad coding habits 6 108
42 Staff COO 2 Illness (Health) 7 Illnesses due to change of weather 7 98
10 Electronic Data CIO 5 Data theft 6 Breaching legal requirements 3 90
28 IT Hardware CIO 2 Heat 6 Susceptibility of Equipments to temperature variations 7 84
30 IT Hardware CIO 2 Heat 6 Susceptibility of Solder joints to melt at high temperatures 7 84
40 Staff COO 2 Illness (Health) 7 Weak immune systems due to genetic variations 6 84
41 Staff COO 2 Illness (Health) 7 Incomplete Immunisation to Common Diseases 6 84
43 Staff COO 2 Accidents 6 Ignorance to Precautions 7 84
44 Staff COO 2 Accidents 6 General carelessness and forgetfulness 7 84
45 Staff COO 2 Accidents 6 Tendency to take risks, being fearless 7 84
29 IT Hardware CIO 2 Heat 6 Susceptibility of Processor Chips to melt at high temperatures 6 72
31 IT Hardware CIO 2 Humidity 4 Non-water resistant Equipments 8 64
33 IT Hardware CIO 2 Humidity 4 Susceptibility to short circuiting due to water/moisture contact 7 56
32 IT Hardware CIO 2 Humidity 4 Susceptibility to corrosion due to rusting 5 40
ABOVE RISK 
APPETITE
BELOW RISK 
APPETITE
RISK APPETITE
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3.5 Analysis 
 
3.5.1 Risk Appetite 
 
Risk appetite is the amount and type of risk that an organization is prepared to pursue, retain or take [21]. The 
organisation management establishes the risk appetite. 
 
Threat Impact Levels Heat Levels 
ACUTE [Avoid]                   
MAJOR [Avoid]                   
SIGNIFICANT [Mitigate]                  
MINOR [Transfer]                   2,10,10  
INSIGNIFICANT 
[Accept] 
                
 
1,10,10 
<30% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Threat Occurrence Possibilities/Likelihoods 
 
                                                    TABLE.4 Risk Register heat map 
 
From the risk register in the TABLE.3, the Heat map (TABLE.4) is derived which is then shared with management 
to determine the Risk Appetite. For this organisation, the risk appetite line is set midway between (asset, threat, 
vulnerability) values (1, 10, 10) and (2, 10, 10) which respond to risks equal to 100 and 200 respectively. Our Risk 
appetite is therefore 150. Any threat above this appetite is not acceptable and must be avoided or controlled whereas 
any risks below 150 appetite line can be tolerated but subjected to handling guidelines of the organisation as 
specified in the ISM policies. Threats categorised as acute, major and critical (RED) have to be avoided and 
eliminated. Significantly harmful threats (YELLOW) are to be reduced by mitigation. Minor threats (GREEN) 
should be transferred by collaborating with an insurer whilst accepted insignificant threats need to be monitored. 
 
3.5.2 Impact Controls 
 
Controls are those activities that are taken to manage identified risks [22]. A control or countermeasure is placed to 
modify the risks and to counter threats. Controls can be used to prevent, deter, deflect, mitigate, detect and recover 
from a security breach, incident or compromise. The possibility for harm to is called risk [23]. ISO/IEC 27001 
determines controls by design or from other sources. Some of the sources are the code of practice and industry 
standards. Although not all institutions can afford to purchase, install, operate and maintain expensive security 
controls and related systems, the decisions on security controls to be applied have to balance considerations of 
security risk and resource constraints. The identified control sets will change risks identified in the risk assessment 
process. They will be able to work together to reduce risks. For the implemented controls, it is vital to check whether 
new controls conflict with existing controls and whether there is any redundancy or how effectively they will work 
together. 
 
The risk register in TABLE.3 identifies Electronic Data, Reputation, Revenue Management System and Staff as 
high-risk assets. The control mechanisms to be applied in this assessment will aim at achieving the highest 
preventive techniques/controls of the respective threats. We shall adopt all three categories of control measures that 
include administrative, Technical and physical. Combination of specific information security policies in line with 
ISO270001 and NIST, elaborate monitoring, preventive, corrective, deterrent and discovery technical tools/measures 
and physical security techniques are best suited for effective controls. Therefore for effective information security 
adopting Least Privilege, Defense in Depth and separation of duties security principles approach, we incorporate 
several controls measures proposed below to eliminate, reduce, transfer or let the risks be accepted. 
 
 
 
 
Acceptable RISK 
APPETITE: 
150 
NOT 
Acceptable 
Critical 
Safe 
Warning 
Monitor 
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Least Privilege Security: no communications or activities to be permitted unless there is a need [3]. 
Defence in depth Security: use of multiple security techniques or layers of control to reduce exposure if one 
security control is compromised [3]. 
Separation of Duties: minimise errors and make it more difficult to exploit access privileges for personal gain [3]. 
 
Administrative Controls 
 
Use of “soft controls” like policies, change control, user registration, visitors logs, punishment for failure to comply, 
roles, responsibilities and job descriptions.  The following are specific Information Security Policies to ensure 
proper information security culture in the organisation: Encryption policy, Secure Data Transmission Policy, data 
lifecycle policy, Clean desk policy, Data breach policy, Digital signature acceptance policy, Disaster recovery plan 
policy, Email policy (cooperate emails labelling according to origin for easy identification of phishing emails), Non-
disclosure agreement for service providers, Ethics policy, Password protection and construction policy, Security 
response plan policy. Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) can be used to reduce risks regarding the organisation's 
resources particularly IT systems. These policies will ensure social engineering and human error control and the 
overall information security management in the organisation will be improved. The policies should be reviewed 
every two (2) years. Implement continues information security awareness and Policies training. As an administrative 
control should also set up guidelines for competent and skilled personnel hiring along with Pre-employment 
background checks to control hiring fraudulent incompetent staff. Eventually, adopt Data classification and 
labelling, Separation of duties and Job rotations. 
 
Technical Controls 
 
The organisation should implement secure architecture with updated Firewalls, intrusion detection (IDS)/intrusion 
prevention (IPS) and Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) systems, Virus scanners, patch management, antispyware, 
Demilitarized Zones to control against data breaches, SQL injections, cross-site scripting and data theft. Data 
encryption should be enforced to provide data confidentiality, role-based access and account management control to 
manage staff access to information, Virtual Private Networks to provide secure communication channels. Routine 
data backups and server images for fail recovery, audit logs for routine review abnormal behaviours in the systems. 
 
Physical Controls 
 
Use of mantraps and locks to equipment rooms, security guards and CCTV to provide deterrent and detective 
controls, Badges, biometric access and swipe cards for access control against unauthorised access to facilities and 
equipment. The installations and use of backup power generators and batteries will provide control on power 
disruptions that affect the IT hardware and physical security.  
 
3.5.3  Compensating Controls 
 
A compensating control is one that meets the intent of the standard by reducing the exposure to an acceptable level, 
but it may not match the prescribed control in the standard or policy [3]. It is common that control objectives may 
not be fully achieved; hence, risks of irregularities in the business may exist. Management must therefore evaluate 
the cost-benefit of implementing additional controls called compensating controls to reduce the risks further [24]. 
Compensating controls include the Administrative, Technical or Logical and Physical elements as already been 
highlighted above. 
 
3.5.4  Residual Risks  
 
This is the remaining risk exposure level after implementing the recommended controls. It is calculated the same 
way as elaborated in earlier sections above. We should now be able to provide the management with before and after 
snapshots of how the recommended controls will lower the risks to the organisation [3]. 
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4.   FUTURE EXPANSIONS 
A further expansion of this project would worth considering the cost-to-benefit repercussion of implementing the 
stated controls. Thomas talks about a refined Facilitated Risk Analysis, and Assessment Process (FRAAP) 
formulated from the bedrock of ISO 17799 which explains an optimised risk assessment process that takes into 
consideration the cost effectiveness of suggested control measures [25]. He made it clear that the existence of a 
threat does not necessarily mean an organisation is at risk.  
 
The ultimate goal for mitigating risks is to protect the organisation’s resources while ensuring the business maintains 
its objectives and mission. Hence, there could be situations whereby suggested controls could become infeasible for 
the organisation. Implementing some controls could ironically be the threat that leads to a business downfall. 
Controls should be practicable as such that the end justifies the means. Quantifying the overall cost of implementing 
each of the stated controls against the organisation’s capability to implement them would create a room to determine 
what controls should be alternated for a compensating control as discussed in section 3.3.3. 
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
In summary, we identified five key organisation assets electronic data, IT hardware, organisation reputation, the 
RMS software and staffs. The main threats faced by these assets are human errors from staffs, SQL injections, data 
breaches, fraud, cross-site scripting, data theft, social engineering and power interruptions that are responsible for 
the most prominent information security risks in the organisation. Appropriate industry-standard administrative, 
technical and physical controls have been employed to prevent, detect, mitigate and reduce the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities detected with the assets. 
 
One fundamental limitation of this report is the scope of assets used. It is very rare to have an organisation with only 
five key assets. We strongly recommend that ISM practitioners work hand in hand with all stakeholders to ensure 
accurate information for all assets and their vulnerabilities are obtained. However, it should be noted that from this 
report, one should be able to follow systematically the processes and technicalities undertaken in preparing an 
information security risk assessment and management report. Irrespective of the choice of organisation for this 
report, the same principles used in this report apply globally to all industry sectors. 
 
In this organisation report, a qualitative approach was used to assess the risks. However, other organisations would 
prefer to adopt more quantitative approaches which use hard metrics, such as pounds or dollars. It will be common 
to find other terms like exposure factors, single loss expectancy, the annual rate of occurrences, annualised loss 
expectancy and total cost of ownership that all end up being used to address the same issue of risks management. On 
combining with Risk Analysis, the Total Cost of Ownership and Return on Investment calculations should factor 
into proper budgeting. 
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